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Turfan Fragment
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« Reply #360 on: 10:33:50, 19-07-2008 » |
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Does anyone in this context know Antonio Damasio? The Feeling of What Happens, I think, is his best-known book. Would you recommend it?
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Ted Ryder
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« Reply #361 on: 12:05:19, 19-07-2008 » |
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This is probably the 'kinship' book that Milly was expecting. For the first time I could see that there is space in the uncertainty of Quantum Physics for (a, many) God(s) to exist without treading on the toes of science. Admittedly, it was an argument that means neither side contradicts the other, but I wouldn't go quite as far as kinship in the sense that they help each other. I also found it intensely annoying that Polkinghorne is quite logical in his descriptions of how a super-being can exist inside/alongside the known physical world, but that he leapt in at every possibility to then say he believed it was the Christian God / Trinity. I'm not sure Polkinghorne is claiming though that beliefs about the Christian God/Trinity etc can be derived in any way from his arguments about their logical possibility. I've heard him say elsewhere (and can't now remember whether he says this in " Quantum Physics and Theology"?) that as well as science, theology, philosophy and logic his own Christian beliefs are necessarily dependent on 'revelation'. From the way he talks about it he seems to see this as quite different from Kierkegaard's 'leap of faith' (he doesn't see it as non-rational, for example) but, unless I've missed it (?), he hasn't written at length anywhere about what he understands by 'revelation': in what way it is different from other experience and, in particular, why we should take any notice of it. I can entirely understand why contemporary philosophers of religion who are believers shy away from mentioning the 'R' word but, since it seems so central and necessary to their beliefs, it would seem only fair that they should have a go. There's a recent book by the theologian/philosopher Richard Swinburne on the subject but it very much (it seems to me, anyway) starts from the position of belief, which is fine if that is where you are starting from. John Polkinghorne is a man of great eloquence and subtlety of thought and I wish he would give us a book on the subject from the philosophical viewpoint. I'd really like to know his views in more depth. Susan Blackmore's Consciousness:  This was fascinating, mixing philosophy, brain science and medicine. There were a couple of moments I thought the logic was faulty, but I may not have understood some of the language properly or appreciated all the evidence. But I hope she is wrong, because she sort of ends with the self being a complete delusion. I felt quite deflated. I think you are meant to, Tommo, as the first chastening step towards discarding your illusions and seeing the truth  . I agree it is well worth reading but I think it was a leettle bit naughty of OUP to have allowed Susan Blackmore, who is an uncompromising advocate of one particular view of consciousness (obviously fair enough in itself), to steer the conclusions so obviously towards it. I'm not saying she is necessarily wrong but, for the "A Very Short Introduction ... " series which are meant to give a general overview, I don't think that the current alternative approaches, or the weaknesses in her own position, are given anything like a fair crack of the whip. Tsk, tsk, IMHO. I've probably recommended it here before but David Chalmers' 1996 book "The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory" still gives, IMHO, about the best critique of the Dennett/Blackmore position and sketches out what an alternative account might look like.  me 'ead's still spinning |
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I've got to get down to Sidcup.
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richard barrett
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« Reply #362 on: 12:18:59, 19-07-2008 » |
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Guten Tag!
Last night I finished reading Daniel Keyes' Flowers for Algernon, can't think why it passed me by all these years, and me an infrequent but enthusiastic SF reader too. Does anyone know this book? It's a powerful piece of work and I think its appeal would go far beyond that of its genre: in fact the only speculative part of it is the idea of (unspecified) medical techniques to increase "intelligence", which is a good deal less speculative now than it was in the 1960s when the book was written. The ethical and psychological issues embodied in it are as enlightening as in any nonfiction book I've read on the subject of human intelligence (though I dare say a psychologist would regard it with as much headshaking as a composer on reading McEwan's Amsterdam) (which isn't much good on any level IMO).
I've read that Damasio book and didn't find it so very interesting. I shall have to read George's Chalmers recommendation, being myself unmoved by Dennett and Blackmore on consciousness - they seem to have convinced themselves that the solution to the "problem" is to assert that it doesn't exist, and, while that's always a useful kind of thought experiment to carry out, their conclusions seem rather intangible to me and have more than a whiff of sophistry about them.
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Ron Dough
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« Reply #363 on: 12:26:52, 19-07-2008 » |
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I think a "Welcome back" might be in order here....
No, r, I've not read it, but one of the unlikelier snippets of information lodged in the Dough cortex is the fact that there was a West End musical on the subject, starring Michael Crawford, in the late 70s IIRC.
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George Garnett
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« Reply #364 on: 12:34:58, 19-07-2008 » |
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Does anyone in this context know Antonio Damasio? The Feeling of What Happens, I think, is his best-known book. Would you recommend it? It's been an influential book in the field, certainly, and a lot of the later literature necessarily refers back to it and (whether agreeing with it or not) has to take serious account of what Damasio has to say about various issues. It's the book, I suppose, in which "the self", albeit in a new guise, crept back into respectable scientific discussions of consciousness. One of Damasio's central theses is that that the brain couldn't be conscious unless it not only makes representations of objects but also represents some form of 'self' and is able to represent the ways in which that 'self' is itself altered by the represented objects. It has to be said that a lot of the ideas Damasio puts forward are very much 'speculative' if not, ahem, (much shuddering in the labs) 'poetic'. I found it quite a difficult read to be honest because I kept looking for logical step by step arguments and feeling a bit short-changed when they weren't always there. But I think, to be fair, that isn't necessarily what the book was trying to do. I'm not sure I'd actually recommend myself it but I certainly wouldn't want to put anyone off. I think a "Welcome back" might be in order here.... Indeed so! Very good to see you, RB. |
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« Last Edit: 12:48:42, 19-07-2008 by George Garnett »
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Morticia
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« Reply #365 on: 12:37:20, 19-07-2008 » |
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A 'Welcome back' is definitely in order, even though I haven't read the books under discussion which rather limits my contribution here  |
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Antheil
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« Reply #366 on: 12:42:15, 19-07-2008 » |
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Can I just say (like Mort never having read any of the books under discussion) a warm welcome back to Lord Barrett of Abertawe!
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Reality, sa molesworth 2, is so sordid it makes me shudder
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Don Basilio
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« Reply #367 on: 12:48:47, 19-07-2008 » |
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To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under heaven.
A time to weep, and a time to laugh: a time to mourn, and a time to dance
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richard barrett
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« Reply #368 on: 12:55:07, 19-07-2008 » |
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Thank you all. I hope I have a chance soon to clear some of the waffle mountain which has built up in my head, otherwise... well, I assume everyone's seen the film Scanners.
(I was going to post a still from it but thought better of the idea, some people might be eating their lunch around now after all.)
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Sydney Grew
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« Reply #369 on: 13:09:43, 19-07-2008 » |
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One of Damasio's central theses is that that the brain couldn't be conscious unless it not only makes representations of objects but also represents some form of 'self' and is able to represent the ways in which that 'self' is itself altered by the represented objects. . . . I found it quite a difficult read to be honest because I kept looking for logical step by step arguments and feeling a bit short-changed when they weren't always there. Is that not simply Fichte (1795) reheated? The italics all appear in Heath's translation: "If the self exists only insofar as it posits itself, then it exists only for that which posits, and posits only for that which exists. The self exists for the self - but if it posits itself absolutely, as it is, then it posits itself as necessary, and is necessary for the self. I exist only for myself; but for myself I am necessary (in saying ' for myself,' I already posit my existence). " To posit oneself and to be are, as applied to the self, perfectly identical. Thus the proposition, 'I am, because I have posited myself' can also be stated as: ' I am absolutely, because I am.' "Furthermore, the self-positing self and the existing self are perfectly identical, one and the same. The self is that which it posits itself to be; and it posits itself as that which it is. Hence I am absolutely what I am. "The Act now unfolded may be given immediate expression in the following formula: I am absolutely, i.e., I am absolutely BECAUSE I am; and am absolutely WHAT I am; both FOR THE SELF."If the account of this Act is to be viewed as standing at the forefront of a Science of Knowledge, it will have to be expressed somewhat as follows: The self begins by an absolute positing of its own existence."We started from the proposition A = A; not as if the proposition 'I am' could be deduced therefrom, but because we had to start from something given with certainty in empirical consciousness. But it actually appeared in our discussion that it is not the 'I am' that is based on 'A = A' but rather that the latter proposition is based on the former." He must be right must not he? It is self-evident when one stops to think about it and goes through Fichte's logical steps. |
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Stanley Stewart
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« Reply #370 on: 13:24:33, 19-07-2008 » |
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Hi, richard! I, too, haven't read Daniel Keyes's novel, "Flowers for Algernon" and, indeed, it was a disaster in London's West End; The Queen's Theatre. Its theme of new methods of surgery finding a cure for a retarded young man who moves in the direction of genius before the effects wear off, was considered to be bad taste when used as a star vehicle. Surprisingly, it was also adapted for the cinema, in 1968, under the title of "Charly", sensitively portrayed by a fine actor, Cliff Robertson. I saw it at a 'surprise preview' at the Odeon, Camden Town, NW1, but the film was only given a limited release.
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George Garnett
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« Reply #371 on: 14:37:45, 19-07-2008 » |
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He must be right must not he? It is self-evident when one stops to think about it and goes through Fichte's logical steps. Gosh! My knowledge of Fichte is sadly threadbare compared with that of Member Grew so I shall indeed have to 'stop and think about it' as he wisely urges. Fichte was one of the Germans who was very hot on 'the self' and 'self awareness' was he not? So much so that he came to believe did he not that there was not much else lurking in the recesses of the cupboard that we call 'the world' other than a collection of 'selves'. ( Shome mishtake? Do you mean Shelves? Ed.) Unlike Fichte, if I have understood him correctly, Professor Damasio, the Portuguese, believes that the representations that the mind makes are definitely representations of something 'out there'. That alone places the two men in very different metaphysical charabancs does not it? Notwithstanding you have sufficiently piqued my interest in the man Fichte that I may well visit the Public Library next week to borrow a volume of his works. |
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thompson1780
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« Reply #372 on: 19:47:37, 19-07-2008 » |
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I'm not sure Polkinghorne is claiming though that beliefs about the Christian God/Trinity etc can be derived in any way from his arguments about their logical possibility. Oh I entirely agree, GG. But I still felt annoyed whenever he mentioned it. Partly because it was so unconnected. There was a beauty to some of his arguments about how the divine could exist within the rules of science as we know. Then, unconnected, came statements about Polkinghorne's personal belief. Thanks for the encouragement and explanation about OUP's VSI series.  Tommo |
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Made by Thompson & son, at the Violin & c. the West end of St. Paul's Churchyard, LONDON
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increpatio
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« Reply #373 on: 21:27:03, 19-07-2008 » |
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Started on the Archaeology of Knowledge today, while sitting between two people in the back seat of a car who were trying to have a conversation through me. Got through the preface anyway ...
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offbeat
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« Reply #374 on: 21:50:08, 19-07-2008 » |
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The Optimists by Andrew Miller
describing the life of a photographer who returns from seeing a massacre in africa and how it affects his life afterwards
rather disturbing.....
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