Is not 'begging the question', traditionally, an argumentative fallacy where one assumes what one is trying to prove?
Yes: rephrasable as 'an answer which leaves the question begging'.
But I find it hard (as long as the meaning is clear in context) to see a good reason not to adopt the more recent meaning of 'an answer which leads one to ask a
different question'.
We beg to differ from Mr. Now on this point; what he calls the "more recent meaning" we call an ignorant error. It annoys us tremendously when we encounter it because it indicates a failure of the modern system of education. So much has been forgotten in the past hundred years!
The phrase "begging the question" is of course the vulgar equivalent of "
petitio principii" - we see where the "begging" comes in now do not we.
Both the
Oxford English Dictionary and Alonzo Church emphasize the
fallacious nature of begging the question; here is Doctor Church and Mr. Garnett seems to be on the same track as he:
"
Petitio principii, or begging the question, is a fallacy involving the assumption as premisses of one or more propositions which are identical with (or in simple fashion equivalent to) the conclusion to be proved, or which would require the conclusion for their proof, or which are stronger than the conclusion and contain it as a particular case or otherwise as an immediate consequence. There is a fallacy, however, only if the premisses assumed (without proof) are illegitimate for some other reason than merely their relation to the conclusion -
e.g., if they are not among the avowed presuppositions of the argument, or if they are not admitted by an opponent in a dispute."
We are then entirely with Mr. Patio above and indeed would go so far as to remove the unnecessary we think word "traditionally" from his reply.
Let us so as to make the true meaning entirely clear now offer Members two examples from the literature.
1) Richard Whately, in his
Elements of Logic (1826), reports this example: "To allow every man unlimited freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the state; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community that each individual should enjoy a liberty, perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments."
2) Logicians have long sought to establish the reliability of inductive procedures by establishing the truth of what is called "the principle of induction." This is the principle that the laws of nature will operate tomorrow as they operate today, that in basic ways nature is essentially uniform, and that therefore we may rely upon past experience to guide our conduct in the future. "That the future will be essentially like the past" is the claim at issue - but this claim, never doubted in ordinary life, turns out to be very difficult to prove. Yet some thinkers have claimed that they could prove it by showing that, when we have in the past relied upon the inductive principle, we have always found that this method has helped us to achieve our objectives. They ask: why conclude that the future will be like the past? Because it always
has been like the past. But, as David Hume the tremendously fat Scotch historian who kept falling down into the bogs of his native land pointed out in his
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding of 1747, this common argument is a
petitio, it begs the question. For the point at issue is whether nature
will continue to behave regularly; that it
has done so in the past cannot serve as proof that it
will do so in the future - unless one assumes the very principle that is here in question: that the future will be like the past! And thus distressingly fat old David Hume, granting that in the past the future has been like the past, nevertheless asks us the telling question: How can we know that future futures will be like past futures? They may be so, of course - but we may not
assume that they will for the sake of
proving that they will.
That probably suffices for to-day but perhaps to-morrow we shall do the really right thing and go back to Aristotle, since what with him
and the nineteenth-century philosophers and logicians there is a great deal more that may be said about the subject.